



Outer Shirley Regeneration – Final Evaluation of the SRB Programme

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1. Executive Summary

There is evidence that like other Single Regeneration Budget Round 6 (SRB) programmes¹, the Outer Shirley Regeneration (OSR) programme was a form of public intervention which had in-built contradictions between its aims and objectives, where the former may be broadly described as 'community empowerment' the latter involved 'fiscal' responsibility for £45m of public and private funds.

The tension between the desire to engage 'meaningfully' with communities of place and interest, and the need to meet performance targets under a potential sanction of losing funds, can generate circumstances where 'conflicts of interest' may arise.²

For Outer Shirley, the 'conditions' under which the original SRB programme was delivered changed in three significant ways, ways that had a profound impact on the programme.

First, the assumption by SEEDA of ultimate responsibility for the funding started to gear the programme towards achieving Tier 3 (economic) targets, set by SEEDA; and whilst other non-economic projects proceeded to be delivered there was a sense in which those involved believed them to have been 'down graded' in terms of importance.

Second, a high turnover of programme managers, each with their own distinctive style and approach, led to some confusion and misunderstanding about the nature and direction of the programme.

Third, a large capital project (one of three) could not be delivered within the parameters of the programme, this had a significant impact on the programmes overall leverage.

These circumstances may appear inauspicious for our evaluation of the OSR programme; nevertheless the 'available' evidence suggests that despite some difficulties the programme will broadly deliver on all the key indicators of performance.

¹ The National Evaluation of the SRB Programme; Cambridge University (March 2007)

² Ibid (page 265)

Interrogating the Evidence

The key indicators of performance relate to outputs and outcomes; the leverage attracted by SRB funding; the extent to which projects were delivered to budget and on time.

Has OSR delivered its contract with SEEDA?

Judged against the known benchmarks – yes; the SRB ‘contract’ involved the ‘purchase’ of specific outputs by SEEDA, classified as Tier 3 outputs, these were **overwhelmingly met** or exceeded. (Section 3)

Has OSR made a difference?

The evidence suggests that it has. Our poll of residents shows a 69% satisfaction rate for OSR area (50% net) , which while lower than the City average of 76%, is significantly higher than that suggested in 2002 and 2004 Mori polls for the priority areas (37% net). (Section 4 and 7)

Has OSR met its objectives?

In terms of outputs yes; regarding outcomes to some extent. The evidence suggests some problems with a lack of clarity in the programmes original baseline data and the way in which monitoring data was collected from various stakeholders, yet the available evidence shows that OSR has **achieved its strategic objectives** in the areas of Employment, Educational Attainment, access to Life Long Learning and Community Involvement. (Section 4)

The only area of concern regards the level of recorded crime incidences where the outturn figures show an increase – though this may be a product of new ways of recording crime statistics introduced in 2005.

Has OSR delivered value for money?

We have compared OSR ‘performance’ against national benchmarks and conclude that in areas relating to social benefits, access to services and community involvement, OSR has **demonstrated value for money**. The withdrawal of the Combined Heat and Power scheme from the programme³ has significantly reduced the level of private sector input – this has had an impact on the programmes ‘leverage’, and a minor effect on targeted outputs. (Section 4)

³ CHP is now being developed as a SEEDA stand alone project.

Is there evidence of mainstreaming?

There is strong evidence of mainstreaming through the ongoing support for Children and Family services, Community Wardens, Youth Options, Play Areas and Community Learning aspects of the programme. (Section 6)

Are there examples of good practice?

The Pickles Coppice centre is the first example of a joint Sure Start and Primary Care Trust initiative where early years and health services have combined to deliver an innovative approach to meeting community needs.

The Youth Options project has had a significant positive effect on school absenteeism rates.

Trust Taplin's Childcare Nursery and Crèche provides a 20 place crèche and training centre that supports local people back into work, overcoming one of the more significant barriers to employment. (Section 6)

What lessons can be drawn from the OSR experience to inform the development of an Action Plan for the area?

Perhaps the main lessons to be drawn from the OSR experience are:

- Be clear about programme limitations and the scope for innovation and risk taking – the shift towards Tier 3 targets and the emphasis on economic development outputs could have been better explained and integrated into the programme.
- Avoid raising expectations that cannot be met – the successful SRB bid was greeted with a fanfare of publicity that spoke of 'hand-outs' and 'windfalls'⁴ – with the expectation that the programme would be largely community led – where in reality many OSR 'projects' had been identified through the bidding process.
- Establish a mechanism for ensuring ongoing evaluation to allow for a review of, and where appropriate amendments to the programme.

⁴ 'DETAILS emerged today of how £15 million of regeneration cash would benefit thousands of people in Southampton.' Southampton Echo (August 2000)

2. Introduction

- 2.2. The Outer Shirley Regeneration programme (OSR) initiated through a successful Round 6 Single Regeneration Budget bid (SRB), formally completed on the 31st March 2007.

Methodological Issues

- 2.3. In this evaluation, while we follow the guidance offered by SEEDA we consider an assessment of the 'distance travelled' and lessons learnt to be of equal importance to the formal measurement of the effectiveness of the programme in meeting contracted outputs and outcomes.
- 2.4. SEEDA suggests that the main purposes of a Final Evaluation Report are:
- To assess whether and the extent to which the Programme's objectives have been achieved
 - To assess the quality of delivery systems
 - To identify good practice for wider dissemination
 - To report back to stakeholders and funders of the schemes achievements
- 2.5. We would add that the Evaluation should also:
- Assess how far the programmes original objectives were reasonable and achievable
 - Draw conclusions as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the form of public intervention under scrutiny – i.e., here, SRB as a policy instrument
- 2.6. With hindsight we know that there were serious 'flaws' in the way that SRB nationally was organised and structured which have created difficulties for all SRB evaluations.
- 2.7. In the initial phases of SRB, there was no guidance on assembling 'SMART' (Strategic, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-limited) baselines. Where it existed guidance was either heavily prescriptive (the

need to assemble programmes under key strategic themes) or inappropriate to local conditions.

- 2.8. Many output indicators were and remain at best vague at worst incomprehensible (e.g. numbers accessing cultural facilities – tell you nothing about which facilities and quality of service, and does not allow for a link between outputs (numbers) and the effects of interventions (outcomes)).
- 2.9. The shift of responsibility for SRB from government offices to regional development agencies, involved a reordering of priorities towards the RDA’s own performance targets (Tier 3’s) which were predominantly economic development in focus, with the subsequent result that many of the social and environmental objectives of SRB programmes have been unintentionally ‘down graded’.
- 2.10. Along with inconsistencies associated with changes in overall SRB management and policy, our evaluation has also been hampered by ‘on the ground’ issues.
- 2.11. The OSR ‘area’ is made up of one full and two part wards – as much information is collected on a ward basis this has limited our ability to ‘capture’ the data for OSR.
- 2.12. As we record in the base line study in Section 3 it has been impossible to verify some of the assertions made in the original bid document. We also observe that in some areas there was insufficient evidence available to assess the outcomes of SRB interventions.

Conditions of the SRB Contract

- 2.13. While Round 6 SRB programmes were regarded as more flexible than previous rounds, with some having a ‘free year’ in order to develop partnership working and undertake feasibility studies – there were nevertheless some fairly prescriptive elements of the programme that provided the conditions for management and implementation.
- 2.14. From the outset it was expected that OSR would follow the key Strategic Objectives (SO) agreed by SEEDA:

SO1 To create safe, attractive, healthy homes and environment
SO2 To improve education and lifelong learning opportunities

SO3 To build a cohesive, confident and outward looking community
SO4 To improve economic, social and physical connections with the rest of Southampton

- 2.15. In fact these OSR Strategic Objectives did not conform to those suggested by SEEDA guidance and we could find no evidence to explain the different approach.⁵
- 2.16. From our consultations there appears to be a majority view that in 1999 the evidence base for the OSR was of varying quality and that the Strategic Objectives were determined on the best available evidence. Nevertheless it appears that the SO's, once determined, became 'locked' into the system of accountability and reporting and did not change even as the evidence base became more robust.

The Accountable Body

- 2.17. All SRB programmes require there to be an 'accountable body' typically (though not always) the local authority. The accountable body underwrites the programme in terms of financial accountability and legal responsibility. With the draw down of funding being made three months retrospectively, there are not many organisations, apart from local authorities, that can carry such a deficit.
- 2.18. In most SRB programmes the local authority as the accountable body was also a recipient of SRB funding for lead projects, where potential 'conflicts of interest' would be managed through the 'appraisal process' which provided for an independent assessment of projects.

The Partnership Board

- 2.19. All SRB programmes required the setting up of a Partnership Board made up of members of the community and key stakeholders
- 2.20. There was no guidance provided by the Government Office for the South East (GOSE) or SEEDA as to how an SRB programme Board should be 'fit-for-purpose', with the composition, collective and individual responsibilities left to local partners.

⁵ SEEDA Strategic Objectives: SO1 Enhance the employment prospects and skills of local people; SO2 Address Social Exclusion; SO3 Promote sustainable regeneration; SO4 Support and promote growth in local economies and business; SO5 Tackle crime and improve community safety.

The Context

- 2.21. The OSR programme developed within the context of the constraints and parameters set by SEEDA (largely inherited from GOSE).
- 2.22. The accountable body was responsible for collecting and coordinating monitoring returns and submitting annual Delivery Plans, effectively a gateway between OSR and SEEDA, with ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the programme delivered to time and on budget, with a sanction of 'claw back' always available to SEEDA.
- 2.23. While this role did not present difficulties in the early years the evidence suggests a growing tension between 'community engagement on the one side, and an imperative to ensure effective delivery of projects, on the other.

3. Outputs and Value for Money

3.1. In the following we consider how far OSR 'delivered' its contracted outputs. The main requirement of the 'contract' with SEEDA is the delivery of Tier 3 targets. The following shows that OSR has met or exceeded all but one of the Tier 3 targets.

Code/Type	Delivery Plan	Approved	Forecast	Actual	Outturn
C1A Net jobs created & safeguarded	77.90	91.90	110.40	106.90	112.90
C1B Number of gross new FDI jobs created & safeguarded	0	2	2	2	2
C2 Hectares of land remediated or recycled	8.50	8.50	9.50	174.53	180.03
C3A No of learning opportunities created & filled (3-30hrs)	12,408	15,633	15,473	24,565	25,237
C3B No of learning opportunities created & filled (30hrs +)	2,278	2,251	2,534	3,542	3,612
C4A No of net new businesses created or attracted to the region that begin trading	8	8	22	5	11
C4B No of net new businesses created or attracted to the region sustained for 12mths	4	4	5	0	2
C5 Investment benefiting deprived areas ('000)	1,185	3,418	3,532	3,253	3,988

Code/Type	Delivery Plan	Approved	Forecast	Actual	Outturn
S2 No of businesses receiving specialist advice, aimed at improving business performance	46	45	100	80	91
S4 Number of adults receiving basic skills training (3+ hours)	388	394	428	508	576
S4A No of adults receiving basic skills training(3+hrs)	0	0	6	3	3
S5 Number of individuals receiving ICT training (3+ hours)	600	716	1,468	2,237	2,325
S6 Number of adults receiving high level skills training (3+ hours)	72	52	418	1,012	1,027
S6A No of individuals receiving high level skills training (3+hrs)	0	0	60	817	817
S7 No of businesses and individuals having broadband access	72	72	72	216	216

- 3.2. The overall assessment of SRB programmes is based on three factors; the number of outputs purchased by SRB, the number of outputs influenced by SRB and the overall affects of SRB public expenditure or the 'outcomes' of the programme.
- 3.3. Other factors that are important but not primary include 'leverage' (or money attracted) ratio i.e., a calculation of the additional money SRB attracts based on £1.00 of exchequer expenditure; value for money (VFM) or how cost effective the programme has been based on unit cost per output.

Leverage

- 3.4. The OSR programme concluded with expenditure some way below the original contract because of SEEDA's decision to remove the Combined (CHP) Heat and Power scheme from the programme. CHP would have accounted for some £30m of private investment (and therefore a much higher leverage).
- 2.24. SRB expenditure of £15, 555,463 'Other' public sector expenditure of £23,918,014 and Private expenditure of £6,297,630 means that every £1 of SRB attracted an additional £1.9 from other sources – the National SRB Evaluation⁶ suggests an average leverage of £4 for every £1 of SRB.

Value for Money (VFM)

- 3.5. We recognise the problem of seeking to apply a VFM methodology when some key outputs are dependent on large capital projects that have yet to be fully implemented. This inevitably means that a direct cost-per-output analysis is bound to be 'skewed'. The heavy 'back loading' of the programmes capital projects has not been helped by changes to the rules governing gap funding which occurred after the programme was approved.
- 3.6. What the VFM analysis provides is a framework rather than a comprehensive assessment.

Cost-Effectiveness – What is Value for Money?

- 3.7. Reliable unit costs are an important tool for decision-making in local economic development, enabling those responsible for project and programme appraisal to assess:
- Historic performance in delivering outputs against spending (cost-effectiveness)
 - Future justification for project-level spending to achieve targets (value for money: VFM)
 - The vast array of different regeneration funding regimes, output measures and differing local contexts provides a difficult environment in which to establish benchmarks – indicators against which services, processes and performance can be measured and compared with others – to inform resource-allocation.

⁶ The Single Regeneration Budget: Final Evaluation; University of Cambridge (March,2007)

Challenges

- 3.8. Even when it is possible to separate different funding programmes and identify specific outputs, difficulties remain due to uncertainties regarding the qualities of outputs, namely their
- Duration
 - Quality
 - Impact over time
- 3.9. Another challenge is distinguishing between gross and net figures. The net figure is the true *Additionality* of the regeneration activity – i.e. that which otherwise would not have taken place. The difference between the gross and net figures is the *deadweight*. SRB takes place within a complex local funding environment that includes significant volumes of mainstream spending.
- 3.10. Added to this are the issues of *displacement* – where regeneration activities may have displaced or diverted economic activity from other areas (usually business location) and substitution – for example where a worker gets a job as a result of SRB supported training at the expense of another worker in the local labour market.
- 3.11. The major methodological hurdle in establishing cost benchmarks and measuring value for money is, however, the difficulty of adding together the disparate streams of benefits that are produced in order to derive an aggregate benefit per unit cost of public expenditure involvedⁱ. In an ideal world, for example, the evaluator would audit individual outputs achieved and the costs incurred for each in much the same way as an accountant would audit a company's accounts.
- 3.12. In reality, however, measured outputs often relate to several different areas of the programme. In addition, there are diverse benefits being produced by programmes as a whole, which make it difficult to get this information from past schemes to provide adequate comparisons, or benchmarks.

Our Approach

- 3.13. The approach adopted here seeks to surmount these obstacles by using the Gross Unit Cost Value for Money approach advocated in HM Treasury (EGRUP) Guidance for the Evaluation of Regeneration Measures. EGRUP is the Evaluation Group on Regional and Urban Programmes.

3.14. Under this approach VFM is measured as the ratio of Exchequer Cost to identified outputs or benefits – in other words, cost effectiveness. This approach has been used in the following studies:

A Framework for the Evaluation of Regeneration Projects and Programmes (HM Treasury, 1995)

Evaluation of the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund – A Partnership for Regeneration: An Interim Evaluation (Brennan, Rhodes & Tyler; DETR, 1998)

National Evaluation of the Former Regeneration Programmes (Scottish Executive, CRU; 2000)

New Deal for Communities 2001-2005 an Interim Evaluation (Sheffield Hallam University, 2005)

The National Single Regeneration Budget – Final Evaluation (Cambridge University, March 2007).

The first stage in this process is to prepare a simple cost-benefit account, which confronts Exchequer Costs with a basket of different types of output, or benefit that cannot be added together as a single indicator of performance. Public funding (Public £) is related to the broad basket of benefits and a Gross Benefit per £20,000 is calculated where $x = \text{£ Public}$ and $y=20$.

$$\text{Gross benefits per £20k} = \frac{(x/y)}{\text{Output}}$$

3.15. This approach provides a crude benchmark for the range of outputs achieved, and does not represent an accurate audit-led 'cost per output'. Indeed, where there is very little activity and/or spending - e.g. private sector dwellings - there will be a disproportionately high unit cost relative to another programme whose core focus was housing renewal. Nonetheless, this method establishes a level playing field between the output-costs of different national regeneration spending streams and enables direct comparisons to be made about the overall level of cost effectiveness.

3.16. It is therefore possible to measure how much of each item within the overall basket of outputs was generated for each ⁷£20,000 of Exchequer Cost and SRB funding incurred. These figures can then be compared with the results of this approach when applied to a range of other national regeneration programmes.

Limitations

3.17. The analysis is not *weighted* to reflect the dominance of individual output measures that would begin to add a more audit-led perspective. Hence a programme dedicated to providing childcare places, for example, would achieve greater unit cost efficiency than a land reclamation programme with small-scale childcare provision. Accordingly, cost effectiveness figures to some extent reflect programme orientation.

3.18. Since our purpose is to establish broad comparators based on a unified methodology, these benchmarks nonetheless provide a reliable basis for understanding variations in output unit costs.

3.19. OSR had exchequer funding of £39,473,477 (SRB + Other Public) giving a unit cost multiplier of 1,974 ($39,473,477/20,000$).

⁷ The National Mid Term SRB Evaluation also used a £20k basket

Unit Cost Comparisons – OSR and the National SRB Evaluation (mid-term)

Code	Output measure/description	Outputs 2004/05	Outputs 2005/6	Outputs 2006/7	Total	OSR Output per £20K	National SRB Outputs per £20K
1A(i)	Jobs created/Safeguarded	119.2	142.7	12	277	0.21	0.8
1B	Pupils benefiting through improved attainment	23,182.50	24951.5	605	25556.5	13.0	13.4
1C	People trained obtaining qualifications	1,047	1396	185	1581	0.8	1.6
1D	Residents accessing employment	309	552	206	758	0.4	0.4
1I	People from disadvantaged groups who obtain a job	179	258	60	318	0.16	0.03
1J	Young People benefiting from social development	24,388	26553	824	27377	13.9	4.6
2A	New business start-ups	0	11	12	23	0.01	0.1
2D	Businesses advised	77	108	20	128	0.06	0.6
3A(ii)	Dwellings improved/completed	406	406	0	1247	0.63	0.3
5A(i)	People benefiting from community safety initiative	54,716	79520	24404	103924	52.7	19.1
6B	Hectares of land improved/reclaimed for development	1.4	1.4	0	1.4	0.00	0.02
7B+	Numbers using additional health, sport, cultural facilities				82231	41.6	31.9
8A(i)	Voluntary organisations supported	279	321	37	358	0.18	0.3
8C	Individuals employed in voluntary work	1,172	1332	141	1473	0.75	0.5
10A	New child care places provided	146	258	85	343	0.17	0.09

3.20. What emerges from this somewhat crude comparison it that OSR programme has tended to under-form in relation to 'hard' economic development type outputs but out performs in delivering social benefits.

3.21. Overall OSR was equal to or better that the national average in 9 of 14 indicators – where it fell short of the average this can be mainly attributed to its social and environmental rather than economic development focus.

3.22. It also possible to develop some national benchmarks on 'cost per unit' using a range of comparable approaches to public intervention. This simply divides the number of outputs by the amount of SRB spent. In the following we have drawn from the Mid-term national SRB evaluation; the National Evaluation of the Former Regeneration Programmes in Scotland and the Mid Term Evaluation of the New Deal for Communities Programme (NDC).⁸

		SRB National	Scotland	NDC	OSR
1A	Number of jobs (i) created	£25,000	£87,012	£60,395	£97,465
	Number of jobs safeguarded (ii)	£15,655	-	£87,065	£315,787
1D	Number of residents of target areas accessing employment through training, careers advice or specifically targeted assistance	£81,370	£8,532		£52,075
2A	Number of new business start ups	£113,316	£767,757	£80,431	£1,716,238
5A	Beneficiaries of Community Safety Initiatives	£525	-		£379
5C	Number of community safety initiatives	£2,046,845	-		£487,326
8A	(i) & (ii) Number of voluntary & community organisations supported wholly or in part by the SRB	£72,529	-	£39,358	£37,809
8C	Number of individuals involved in voluntary work	£100,129	£135,956	£20,925	£26,798
10A	Number of new childcare/childminding places provided	£271,200	£11,851	£102,072	£115,085

3.23. Again this is a somewhat 'crude' measure but one that reinforces that point the OSR appears to have performed particularly well in areas that

⁸ We have identified a small number of indicators that appear to be comparable for one or more programme.

produce a social benefit particularly in Community Safety and support for the Community/Voluntary sector.

Our Approach to Additionality

- 3.24. What has the scheme achieved once deadweight is removed? Or more accurately what difference did SRB make when you discount effects that might have happened anyway or effects that merely displaced other macroeconomic or local effects.
- 3.25. This can only be properly considered in relation to a defined geographical area – target area and local economy, for example. One of the problems here is that the OSR target area comprises one complete and two part wards.
- 3.26. This assessment needs to take place in relation to a) funding and b) outputs (there is no basis for assuming that 100% additional funding will translate into additional outputs). The national mid-term evaluation of SRB used local research to identify a funding Additionality of 57% at a target area scale and 44% at the scale of the local economy and output Additionality of 55% and 43% respectively.
- 3.27. The same study apportioned weighted values to the four key output targets of Jobs, Training, Housing and Community Safety that appeared to be common across the study area. This weighting suggests that 'relative' Additionality needs to be apportioned at a third of Job creation outputs (33.3%) between 50%-60% for Training leading to Qualifications, between 35%-40% for housing schemes and between 50%-60% for Community Safety Schemes.
- 3.28. We have adopted this approach to our evaluation of the OSR programme which suggest a net additional benefit in the following key areas:

Indicator	Numbers	Additionality
Jobs Created	155	47
Training	1581	790
Housing	1234	492
Community Safety	102934	61,758

Conclusions

3.29. We have considered three factors in the 'mix' of attributes that can be used to determine whether OSR has 'delivered':

- Judged against Tier 3 targets the programme as met its contractual requirements;
- Judged against unit costs, the programme has outperformed comparable programmes in producing value for money in areas of social and environmental benefit.
- Judged against the national benchmarks the programme has performed as well as the national SRB and NDC programmes on most indicators.

3.30. In the next section we consider how far these 'achievements' have made a real difference for the communities with the OSR area.

4. Outcomes

- 4.1. In this section we consider whether the programme has made a tangible difference for the communities of the OSR area.
- 4.2. The 'outcomes' here refer to the overall impacts that OSR has had in addressing the concerns reflected in the Year 1 Base Line Assessment (BLA) – which identifies the nature of the 'problems' then an estimate of the likely consequences of the SRB programme in aiming to address them, finally providing a means for undertaking an evaluation that will determine how far they have in fact been addressed.
- 4.3. Ideally, the BLA would be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time Limited) – for OSR like many SRB programmes this ideal has been lacking.
- 4.4. However, the amount and quality of data available at the start of this seven year SRB programme will always look impoverished when contrasted with the sophistication of Super Output Areas (SOA's) and Indices of Multiple Deprivation (2002)(2004 revised) which allow for street level analyses of need and social/economic disadvantage.
- 4.5. The Mid term evaluation of the OSR programme made some reasoned recommendations on how to achieve 'smarter' baseline indicators⁹ these were not adopted so we base our assessment on the available evidence.
- 4.6. Our detailed assessment of the outcomes of the OSR is presented at appendix 2 – here we focus on the main achievements of the programme as measured against its original aims.
- 4.7. In the following we list the aims of the original SRB 'Southampton Community Futures' and assess on the basis of the available evidence, how far they have been met.

⁹ Interim Evaluation of the Outer Shirley Regeneration Programme', Centre for Creative Development, Southampton Institute and Civic Regeneration Ltd (July 2003)

Original Bid Target	End of Programme Achievements
Increasing the number of people who consider the bid area to be a desirable place to live	In 2002 net satisfaction ¹⁰ was assumed to be 37%; now the net satisfaction rate is 50% for OSR and 61% for Redbridge
Reducing crime and anti-social incidents	In 1999 there were 3303 recorded incidence; for 2006/7 the figure is 3991 – much of the increase can be attributed to new methods of recoding crime introduced in 2005
Improving in major health indicators	All PCT practices have achieved their targets
Increase the number of residents accessing lifelong learning	1581 new qualifications; 2106 people receiving ICT training; 506 adults receiving basic skills training; 20899 people attending Lifelong Learning advice sessions. These 'outputs' are useful 'proxy' indicators of a higher take up lifelong learning
Improving in educational attainment	The data shows that Redbridge and Millbrook are now performing better than the LEA average.
An increase in the level of community activity and involvement	686 community groups supported; 3825 people involved in planning objectives for their communities; proxy indicators for an overall increase in the level of community activity and involvement.
An increase in contact with the rest of the city	No data available
A Reduction in the comparative level of long term unemployment	At Jan 2007 Total claimant count longer than 18 months for all 25+ was 3.4% compared to 3.8% city average.

- 4.8. The available evidence suggests that OSR has had a significant impact in addressing the concerns articulated in the original bid.
- 4.9. While some outcomes (health) may take many years to work through into the statistics, our overall assessment of the OSR baseline position compared to the end of programme position, suggests that people are generally more satisfied with the area; access to health services has improved; educational attainment has improved; access to life long learning has increased - all positive moves in the right direction.
- 4.10. The only potentially negative outcome is that the incidence of crime may have increased though further work is needed to determine how far the statistics reflect new waves of collecting data.
- 4.11. A more detailed examination of the Base Line position at the start of the programme and the 'outturn' at its completion suggests that there are areas where the paucity of data makes impossible to develop a direct comparison. (Appendix2)
- 4.12. Elsewhere we have detected a lack of coordination between stakeholders in terms of information flows and methods for capturing data in a form that was consistent. This may be a product of the fact that different stakeholders would not necessarily collect information on the basis of an Outer Shirley profile, but rather on the geography of the service.
- 4.13. Finally, delays to the CHP project meant that none of the 'fuel poverty' targets could be met.

Conclusion

- 4.14. On balance, and notwithstanding gaps in the information available, we judge that OSR has made a significant impact on the quality of life for people living in the OSR area.

5. The Partnership

- 5.1. In this section we consider the role of the OSR Board and consider, if briefly, the factors that led to its dissolution in 2006.
- 5.2. On the evidence there is a strong consensus amongst stakeholders that for the first 4 years of the programme the OSR Partnership Board was a highly regarded and effective agency for the management and implementation of the programme.

Community Engagement/Involvement

- 5.3. In the early years the 'community' were seen as the main drivers of the programme, with community representatives being supported by eight 'thematic' coordinators, who were appointed to help build local capacity and work through the initial stages of project developments, through to appraisal and implementation.
- 5.4. From the evidence there were very high expectations by the 'community' of the depth and breadth of their involvement with the programme.
- 5.5. Indeed, from our stakeholder consultations, no one dissented from the view that a major objective of the programme was 'community empowerment', where the legacy of the programme would be 'stronger safer communities' where local people would be able to influence and shape decisions that affect their quality of life.
- 5.6. As community involvement strengthened (and was legitimised through local elections), so community representatives grew confidence and knowledge.

RISE

- 5.7. The 'Regeneration Inspired Social Enterprise' (RISE) Community Development Trust was established on the 20th December 2004 as the OSR successor vehicle.
- 5.8. As a 'social enterprise' and community development trust, RISE set out to establish core activities that would generate income and profits, that would be reinvested back into the community, meeting the objectives of the company which are that 'RISE will become the leading community

development trust in the UK working towards a sustainable community led organisation that will benefit the community they serve with':

- Socially Responsible economic activity
- Being a Market Orientated Organisation
- Developing Young People
- Environmental Responsible Economic Activity
(RISE Annual Report, 31st March 2006)

5.9. RISE's Annual Report anticipates an annual turnover of £140,000 by April 2007 principally from the sale of computers via a subsidiary RISE Computers. The latest information shows RISE trading at a £18,852 loss, with an expected return to profitability by April 2006 – this has yet to be evidenced.

5.10. During the OSR programme it was anticipated that RISE would benefit from an estimated £1.5m support from SRB funds, which would be used to create a sustainable income flow through the development of a 'viable' business.

5.11. In the event none of the proposals submitted by RISE were considered viable by the accountable body (SCC) or SEEDA and the £1.5 was reallocated to other projects within the programme.

Fault Lines in the Programme

5.12. As far as we can judge there are a number of factors, antecedents and circumstances that led to the 'community' resigning from the Board – chronologically these were:

- The 'high' turnover of Programme Managers – leading to a lack of consistency in overall management;
- SEEDA's adoption of responsibility for the programme and the shift in emphasis towards economic development type projects and outputs – we do not believe that the implications of this were understood or well communicated at the time.
- The time limited nature of the role of theme coordinators, which were regarded by the 'community' as a resource – some stakeholders state that the temporary nature of the coordinators role was well understood; others suggest that their withdrawal from the programme market a significant shift toward 'officers' taking a lead;

- The programmes 'under achievement' in terms of private sector contributions and projects (CPH was to have been a major vehicle for delivering private sector leverage) – added pressure to ensure that SRB projects were sustainable over time.
- The development of RISE as the OSR succession vehicle and the assumption that a sum of £1.4m had been 'ring-fenced' to secure its successful transition as a social enterprise. Community Representatives on the OSR Board were also members of the RISE Board – leading to a perceived 'conflict of interest' – whereby decisions regarding the allocation of SRB funding to RISE were delegated to Southampton City Council's Regeneration Executive (RegenExec).

5.13. These circumstances led to a break-down in trust between OSR community representatives, council officials and other stakeholders, where we judge that a reduction in the authority of the Board in key areas of decision making, placed the community representatives in an invidious position, where staying on the Board might be interpreted as agreeing to the decision of the RegenExec not to award RISE the funding it requested.

Conclusions

5.14. The 'history' of the Partnership has been one of high expectations, initial enthusiasm and collaborative working, with commitment and strong relationships being built between stakeholder groups, officers and community representatives – followed by a fracturing of these relationships as pressure mounted to deliver projects and ensure spending targets were met.

5.15. In our judgement, none of the 'parties' to the break-up of the partnership can alone carry responsibility for this outcome – rather we conclude that there were inherent contradictions 'built into' the programme – which with more time and greater flexibility may have concluded with a more positive outcome.

6. Value Added

- 6.1. In this section we consider whether there are aspects of the OSR programme that have 'added value' in developing initiatives and/or projects that benefit local people.
- 6.2. Although this is essentially a 'strategic' evaluation we have looked at specific projects that provide evidence of having had a strategic impact as judge against three principle criteria:

Mainstreaming

Best Practice

Social Exclusion

- 6.3. In addition we have identified a range of projects that have met or exceeded their contracted outputs, while also contributing 'added value'.

Mainstreaming

- 6.4. By mainstreaming we mean the practice of 'projects' funded and/or initiated by the OSR programme, being taken up, adopted or otherwise developed by mainstream service providers.
- 6.5. The OSR Programme has evidently achieved some notable examples of projects that were initiated by the availability of SRB funding that subsequently became adopted by mainstream service providers.
- 6.6. Particular projects that have been mainstreamed include: Community Wardens; Community Learning; Play Area management, and elements of Skills Quest, Youth Options and services for Children and Families.

Best Practice

- 6.7. Less precise than mainstreaming 'best practice' defines a project as holding lessons for future project development or as emerging from acknowledge good practice in the particular area of concern.
- 6.8. OSR projects that met the standard for best practice include: The Warren Centre, the Pickles Coppices Sure Start and PCT Centre.

Social Exclusion

- 6.9. Still less precise the term social exclusion refers typically to 'disadvantaged' individuals or communities of place and/or interest, where innovative approaches are required to attract people into a project or service area, who may otherwise be excluded from participation or engagement.
- 6.10. Projects in the OSR programme that have specifically and successfully addressed issues relating to social exclusion include: new 'user' groups established for the Warren Centre and Pickles Coppice Sure Start/PCT and Mansel Park projects. The Youth inclusion project which has had a direct positive effect on school attendance rates.
- 6.11. The follow provides a summary of key projects that met one or more of our criteria for mainstreaming, best practice and social inclusion.

Case Studies

The Warren Centre

- 6.12. Before the advent of the SRB programme the Warren Centre was dilapidated, rarely used and was regarded with some distain by local people. On the available evidence SRB was the single most significant factor that has led to a vibrant and active centre that is well used and well regarded, which makes a real contribution to Community Learning.
- 6.13. The Warren Centre is regarded as a 'community resource' that has attracted people that might otherwise have remained outside the formal skills/learning environment

Pickles Coppice – Sure Start and PCT

- 6.14. The first example in Southampton of a combined Sure Start and Primary Care Trust facility – located within one of the most deprived areas of the City – the Pickles Coppice is a new building set to the front of the local school.
- 6.15. The link between Sure Start and the PCT means that parents with children under 5 can assess both childcare support services and health services within the same location.
- 6.16. The building has been built through funding from Southampton City Primary Care Trust, Sure Start and the Outer Shirley Regeneration programme.² The services that are to be provided at Pickles Coppice include a wide range of early years provision through the Sure Start

programme, NHS dentistry, podiatry, baby clinics, speech therapy, audiology, contraception and sexual health clinics, respiratory clinics and many more.

- 6.17. Pickles Coppice centre opened in February 2005 to provide a replacement for the old Millbrook Clinic. Much consideration was given to patient needs and expectations. Results of a postal questionnaire sent to homes and feedback from specific focus groups (aimed at older people, younger people and families with young children) helped the partnership gauge the scope of the accommodation required for the centre and informed the Primary Care Trust of the services needed to support the community.
- 6.18. As new Sure Start facilities are being developed in Southampton the Pickles Coppice 'model' is being looked at as a guide to future partnership working.

Trust Taplin

- 6.19. Trust Taplin's Childcare Nursery and Crèche registered in 2004 and is located at the Western Community Hospital in the Millbrook area of Southampton. The nursery is part of the Neighbourhood Nurseries Scheme and Sure Start Initiative.
- 6.20. The nursery is registered to care for up to 100 children under 8 in the nursery, and 20 children in the crèche. There are currently 107 children from birth to 5 years old on roll. The nursery provides funded nursery education for 20 children aged 3-4. The provision supports children that have special educational needs or who speak English as an additional language. Children attend for a variety of sessions.
- 6.21. The facilities include a 20-place crèche and a training centre to support local residents back into the workforce. The courses offered focus on training in childcare and health services, with a view to recruiting those who complete the training into the NHS. The local PCT also has an input, providing health visitors, childcare and podiatry services, as well as out-of-hospital clinics for those with special needs.

Youth Options

- 6.22. The OSR Board departed from tradition in appointing Hampshire & Isle of Wight Youth Options to spearhead a new 'youth strategy' for the OSR area.
- 6.23. The strategy brought together all the relevant stakeholders to develop a 'youth offer' that included a range of partnership based projects that

focused on `youth inclusion, personal and social development, diversionary activities, holiday clubs and workshops.

- 6.24. The A.W.O.L project at Millbrook School ran a series of activities on inclusion, including projects that explored social stereotypes, religious and cultural differences, looking at traditions regarding food, music and art.
- 6.25. Through its outreach work Youth Options was able to work with young people who had been excluded or who were regularly absent – the effect was to dramatically reduce absenteeism rates.

The Conclusion

- 6.26. The evidence from these projects suggest a strong correlation between delivery of outputs, on time and to budget that also produced `added value` in challenging preconceptions; developing innovative ways of working; tackling social exclusion; `seeding` projects that were subsequently taken up by mainstream providers.

7. Residents Survey¹¹

The Background

- 7.1. This section presents the key findings of a survey of 496 residents of the Outer Shirley Regeneration area conducted face to face in their home from mid-February to mid-March 2006. The sample is broadly representative of all residents in terms of age, gender and employment status.
- 7.2. The study had two main parts:
- Questions concerning Outer Shirley as a place to live and improvements needed, termed 'quality of life' section. Some of these findings can be compared with findings for Southampton as a whole from the Residents' Survey conducted in 2004 (MORI);
 - Questions concerning employment, training and barriers to training.
- 7.3. Just over half the sample (52%) had heard of Outer Shirley Regeneration.

Quality of life

- 7.4. The majority of respondents (69%) were satisfied with their local area as a place to live with 19% being very satisfied and 50% fairly satisfied. Overall, 19% were dissatisfied (11% fairly and 7% very dissatisfied). This represents a slightly lower level of satisfaction than was found for the City as a whole (Residents Survey 2004, MORI). In general, people aged under 30 or over 65 or over were slightly more satisfied than others.
- 7.5. Under a quarter of respondents (22%) thought they had any influence over the decisions taken locally whereas almost a half did not (47%). People dissatisfied with their local area were more likely than average to think they had no influence.
- 7.6. Twice as many respondents thought Outer Shirley had got worse in the past two years as thought it had got better. Overall, 17% thought it had got better, 38% thought it had stayed much the same, 40% thought it

had got worse and 7% did not know. Differences in opinion between different groups of respondents were small. This finding is similar to that found for the City as a whole (Residents' Survey 2004, MORI) where 12% thought things had got better and 35% worse.

- 7.7. On balance, respondents thought Outer Shirley was 'good for learning', had 'good quality health services', Southampton was a City with good job prospects and the quality of Council Services overall was good.
- 7.8. On balance respondents disagreed that the area was good for leisure, was one with strong communities, was a safe area or that they were proud of the area.
- 7.9. When compared to Southampton as a whole (Residents Survey 2004, MORI), the opinion on health services, job prospects and the quality of Council services over all were very similar. When thinking about their area (rather than the City), respondents in Outer Shirley were far less happy with leisure services, learning, having strong communities and safety. Respondents were also less likely to say they were proud of their area than residents of the City were for Southampton.
- 7.10. These opinions on Outer Shirley are summarised in the table below:

	Agree	Disagree
This area is good for learning	43%	23%
This area has good quality health services	74%	12%
This area is good for leisure	30%	47%
This area is one with strong communities	25%	46%
This is a safe area	29%	49%
I am proud of this area	27%	44%
Southampton is a City with good job opportunities	49%	20%
The quality of Council services is good overall	54%	20%

- 7.11. When asked about their satisfaction with a range of services and facilities, respondents were most satisfied with parks and open spaces (76% satisfied), health services (74% satisfied), public transport (69% satisfied), primary schools (58% satisfied) and adult learning facilities (50% satisfied).
- 7.12. Respondents were least satisfied with the level of crime and anti-social behaviour (70% dissatisfied), activities for teenagers (69% dissatisfied) and road and pavement repairs (61% dissatisfied). Half of respondents

were dissatisfied with cultural facilities (such as cinemas, museums or theatres) and 48% with wages and the cost of living.

7.13. The five aspects which most needed improving in the area were:

- Crime and anti-social behaviour (67% selected this as one of 5 priorities)
- Activities for teenagers (64%)
- Road and pavement repairs (59%)
- Wages and the cost of living (26%)
- Cultural facilities (21%)

7.14. The five aspects which fewest respondents selected as one of their top priorities for improvement were:

- Primary schools (3%)
- Adult learning (5%)
- Secondary schools (7%)
- Pollution (7%)
- Health services (8%)

Awareness of Outer Shirley Regeneration and its projects

7.15. Just over half the sample (52%) had heard of Outer Shirley Regeneration.

7.16. The level of awareness of projects supported by OSR ranged widely. Three quarters of respondents (78%) had heard of the neighbourhood wardens and just under a half of the improvements to Mansel Park and community learning facilities at Redbridge School. About a third were aware of community learning facilities and Millbrook School, Pickles Coppice Sure Start centre and sports facilities at Redbridge School.

7.17. A total of 45% of respondents had used or visited one or more of the projects listed. 16% had contacted the neighbourhood wardens. One in five respondents with children had visited Pickles Coppice Sure Start centre.

Training and Employment Needs Analysis

- 7.18. Overall, 44% of working age respondents were in full-time employment with a further 2% being self-employed. A total of 10% were working part-time 16-39 hrs per week with a further 5% working fewer hours than this. A small proportion (1%) were working in a casual or temporary job. A total of 8% said they were unemployed and actively looking for work. A total of 16% were unwaged – caring for others with a further 1% saying they would consider looking for work in the near future. 7% were not working due to poor health or disability and 2% were retired. In addition, 3% of respondents of retiring age were working full-time and 3% part-time.
- 7.19. A high proportion of respondents had jobs which were relatively low skilled and likely to be low paid. The proportion of respondents in managerial (10%), professional (2%) or associate technical or professional occupations (14%) was much smaller than the proportion in the City as a whole. 8% of respondents had clerical occupations and 11% skilled manual occupations. A total of 9% of respondents rising to 18% of women has personal service occupations. 10% were sales assistants or customer service, 13% process, plant or machine operatives and 22% other elementary occupations.
- 7.20. Few respondents worked in manufacturing (8%). Just over a quarter of respondents rising to 43% of women worked in the public sector, education, health care or social care. Many jobs were care assistants, catering assistants, cleaners or porters.
- 7.21. Just over half of respondents worked in Southampton (58%) with 17% working within the survey area. Others worked nearby, in Lordshill or at the hospital. On average, men travelled further to work than women, but the difference was not large.
- 7.22. One in four working respondents said they would like to change their job, either now or in the near future.
- 7.23. Of all the unwaged respondents (of working age) 50% have not worked for more than four years. Of those who are unemployed and looking for

work, 41% have been unemployed for less than six months and 16% for between 7 and 12 months.

- 7.24. The previous occupation of unwaged respondents was broadly similar to those of working respondents but slightly fewer had managerial or professional occupations and slightly more unskilled occupations.
- 7.25. Over a quarter of working aged respondents (28%) had looked for or asked for information about employment, training or learning in the previous 12 months. The most frequently used sources were the Job centre (38%), the internet (32%), local newspapers (27%) and Connexions (19%).
- 7.26. Almost a third of the sample (31%) rising to 37% of working age respondents have undertaken some form of training or learning in the past two years. Young respondents (67% of 16-19 year olds) and people working full-time (45%) were more likely than average to have undertaken training.
- 7.27. One in three working age respondents (36%) had done training as part of their job or arranged by their employer.
- 7.28. The level of qualifications held is lower than the City or national average but appears to have increased since the 1002 Census of Population.
- 7.29. Compared to the City as a whole, fewer Outer Shirley residents have degree level qualifications but only slightly fewer have level 3 qualifications. A total of 42% of respondents said they had GCSE A-C or O levels, 8% NVQ level 1, 9% NVQ level 2 and 5% NVQ level 3. A total of 5% had a degree with a small number of respondents having BTEC, ONC or HND qualifications. 18% of respondents had a first aid certificate, 13% a food hygiene certificate, 13% of men had a fork lift licence and 12% of men an HGV, LGV or PSV licence.
- 7.30. A total of 8% of respondents were studying for a qualification at the time of the interview.
- 7.31. A total of 40% of all respondents and 48% of working aged respondents said they were interested in doing some training, learning or improving their skills. Interest in training declined with increasing age. Unwaged or unemployed respondents were more likely to want training than full-time working respondents, retired respondents or those not working

through sickness or disability. Women (49%) were more interested in training than men (32%).

- 7.32. The main factors making it difficult for respondents who were interested in training from being able to train or update their skills were: course fees or the cost of equipment (26%), lack of information about courses available (19%), family commitments (18%), lack of time outside work (17%), lack of qualifications (16%) and childcare (14% and 20% of women).
- 7.33. When asked which of a possible list of services or support would make it easier to undertake training, courses provide in Outer Shirley (19%), courses you could do at home (37%), subsidised bus or travel fares (15%), childcare on site (11%) and training provided during school hours (17%) were the most popular amongst respondents interested in training.
- 7.34. When asked which of a list of skills or support might help them find a job or find the job they wanted, computer skills, (32%), help and advice about job opportunities (26%), help or advice about what training would be best (24%), help with job applications (21%), improving self confidence (20%) were the most wanted by those interested in training.

A Policy Response to the Findings

- 7.35. The finding from our resident's survey will be used to inform the development of an Action Plan for Outer Shirley which will include proposals on tackling barriers to training and life long learning, educational attainment and employment.

8. Conclusions

- 8.1. We conclude that in the early years OSR was an optimistic, inclusive and effective form of public intervention that built on considerable commitment and good will on the part of all the main stakeholders, working in partnership, striving to make a real difference to the quality of life of the communities living in the OSR area.
- 8.2. We noted methodological issues with the programme, perhaps the most important being that OSR was not a coherent area in terms of communities of place and/or interest.
- 8.3. We also commented on some of the short coming of the baseline data and how a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the programme was hampered by the paucity of available information.
- 8.4. In Section 3 we provided an analysis of Out Puts and Value for Money and conclude that OSR has, despite its difficulties, performed well in areas that have produced social benefits, and fallen short of expectations in attracting private sector leverage.
- 8.5. In Section 4 we looked at all the available evidence on how far OSR has made a positive impact on the area, and conclude that for most of the original objectives there have been significant improvements, which we describe.
- 8.6. In Section 5 we looked at the Partnership and attempted to capture the circumstances that that led to its fragmentation and the resignation of the Community representative of the Board. Here we conclude that there were probably 'factors' outside the control of those involved, a product of SRB as a specific form of intervention, which may not have been foreseen at the time, but which hold important lessons for the future.
- 8.7. In Section 6 – we identified particular projects that we judge to have 'added value' to the programme, through either becoming mainstreamed, or providing an example of 'best practice', or in addressing social exclusion.
- 8.8. In Section 7 – we describe the results of the resident's survey which will lay the foundation for an Action Plan for the OSR area.

- 8.9. Overall, we conclude that despite significant problems in the latter stages of the programme, OSR has met its contractual requirements to SEEDA, delivered reasonable value for money; met or exceeded most of the benchmark indicators of performance and has made a lasting impact on the quality of life of local communities living in the OSR area.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Approach and Methodology

The Stage 1: Review of Literature and the Policy Context

The Policy context will be shaped by a range of initiatives that would, ideally 'converge' at the point of local engagement and delivery, including:

SEEDA's Regional Economic Strategy (RES) and Area Investment Framework plan of action (AIF).

Southampton CC's Community Strategy; Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy; Local Development Framework and Local Area Agreements.

The government's Review of the Third Sector and Change Up initiative and recent changes to the rules governing the disposal of public assets may have direct consequences for the Outer Shirley Action Plan.

Through our consultations with stakeholders will explore the policy focus and implications in the areas of Health, Education, Employment the Environment and Community Engagement.

Developing a mechanism had weaves together these 'top down' and 'bottom up' approaches will be a key task of the Outer Shirley Action Plan.

For the Evaluation aspects we have considered:

The Year 6 Delivery Plan

The Mid Term Evaluation

The 2004 Indices of Multiple Deprivation

Out turn data on Health, Education, Environment and Employment

Stage 2: Stakeholder Analysis

We identified a range of 'stakeholders' that were consulted during the course of the evaluation and preparation of the Action Plan – a full list of Consultees is provided.

Stage 3: Collection and Collation of Relevant Data

We had considerable support from Southampton CC in collecting the relevant data for the Evaluation and Action Plan – while there remain some gaps in the information, we are confident that these will be addressed in the near future.

Stage 4: Stakeholder Consultations

The timetable for the Evaluation and Action Plan has meant that it has not been possible to consult with all the stakeholders face-to-face, many agreed to be

interviewed by telephone. All stakeholders had been sent a briefing note which laid out the purposes of the interview and how the information will be used. Altogether some 28 interviews were completed.

A workshop with local residents was held on the 2nd March 2007 – specifically to consider issues that may be relevant to the Action Plan.

Stage 5: Residents Survey

The resident's survey was completed on the 18th March 2007. The survey will built on the MORI survey conducted in 2004 and was used to ascertain local people's awareness of the OSR programme and perceptions of the impact that the SRB programme may have had in improving the quality of life.

Copies of the questionnaire can be obtained by contacting David Stone at ds@cagconsult.co.uk

Stage 6: Case Studies

Within the time allowed, we identified the following SRB projects for a more detailed case study approach:

Youth Action

PCT Sure Start

The Warren Centre

The Taplin's Project

The case studies were used to inform a brief analysis of 'value added' to the programme through innovative projects, or projects that were mainstreamed.

Stage 7: Evaluation Report

The Evaluation Report was delivered on the 31st March 2007 and includes a detailed assessment of the SRB 6 programmes achievements measured against the baseline position and assessed in terms of tier 3 outputs, programme and project outputs and overall outcomes.

It had been agreed that the evaluation should focus on 'journey travelled' and lessons learnt, as well as complying with SEEDA guidance on undertaking SRB evaluations.

Stage 8: The Outer Shirley Action Plan

We have agreed that there may be some 'slippage' in presenting the Action Plan in order to meet with the Council's internal decision making arrangements, but we expect work to be completed by no later than the 28th April 2007.

Appendix 2: Baseline Assessment

SRB6 Baseline Position and End of Programme Targets

SO1: To create safe, attractive, healthy homes and environment

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>State of the estate Residents survey results to City average</p>	<p>“Low levels of resident satisfaction with the area” and Open spaces in need of investment and maintenance” No actual data for SRB area. However according to a 2002 Mori poll, for the priority areas net satisfaction with the area as a place to live (ie those satisfied minus those dissatisfied) improved was 37% in 2002 compared to 61% for the City as a whole. (The Delivery plan quotes a figure of 71% being satisfied with the area from the 2002 Poll, but the Poll does not appear to produce data at SRB level).</p>	<p>For priority areas, net satisfaction with the area as a place to live improved to 52% in 2004 compared to 62% for the City as a whole.</p>	<p>Net satisfaction for OSR %50 no change since 2004; net satisfaction in Redbridge 61%</p>	<p>The figures show a significant improvement for the priority areas as a whole. However, OSR is one of 11 priority areas, so it is not clear how accurate this is as a proxy indicator.</p>	<p>MORI Southampton Residents Survey 2002 and 2004 CAG Survey 2007</p>
<p>Council properties refused to City average</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>Unknown</p>		
<p>% social housing applications with 1st or 2nd choice for area to City average</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>Unknown</p>		
<p>Non public sector housing increased to 57%</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>Unknown</p>		

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
Number of ethnic minorities living in the area 3%	No data for SRB area	No data for SRB area	Unknown		
Community safety % change in crime to +20%	3303 incidents	3991 incidents Increase 20.8% over baseline	Yes	The Crime Report notes that it is not clear whether the same recording methods have been used and that there have been significant changes to the police systems with the introduction of a new crime recording database in April 2005. It comments that it is highly likely that these figures have been impacted on by such changes and as such should not be used as the sole criteria against which results can be determined.	Baseline data and SRB6 Crime report for 2006 calendar year (produced by CDRP)
Number of criminal damage incidents reduced to 25/1000 people	Criminal damage and arson incidents 963	Criminal damage and arson incidents 1512 which equates to 60 per 1000 people.	No	See above	SRB6 Crime report for 2006 calendar year and based on population estimate of 25100 from Hampshire County Environment Department's 2005 based Small Area Population Forecasts
Incidents of racial harassment	No data available for	No data currently	Unknown		

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>reduced Healthy neighbourhood & Primary care N.B the health targets are joint targets with the Primary Care Trust (PCT). 20% reduction in under 18 conception rates</p>	<p>SRB area</p> <p>Teenage pregnancy rates (15-17) 7% compared to 5.8% in City (from Mid Term Evaluation)</p>	<p>available for SRB area Note: no health data in 2006/7 Delivery Plan</p> <p>Southampton (as a whole) has a rate of 58.8 per 1000 females aged between 15-17 years.</p> <p>Outer Shirley Area has a rate of 61.86 per 1000 females aged between 15-17 years.</p> <p>:</p>	Unclear	<p>There has been a significant improvement, but the baseline figure available is not detailed enough to determine whether the 20% target has been reached.</p> <p>The overall rate quoted for Southampton is the "official" figure, whilst the Outer Shirley figure is an estimate based on hospital activity data and is subject to error.</p> <p>The number of teenage pregnancies in the priority neighbourhood in a single year is relatively small and therefore is subject to large confidence intervals.</p>	PCT
<p>4% reduction in the proportion of women who smoke during pregnancy Reduction of smoking rates from 36-30%.</p>	<p>No data available for SRB area</p> <p>No baseline data provided</p>	<p>No data available for SRB area</p> <p>Lifestyle Survey:39% "smoke regularly" in 2006</p>	<p>Unclear</p> <p>No</p>	<p>It is not clear where the 36% figure came from and if it is comparable to the 2006 figure, but if it is, the situation has got worse.</p>	2006 figures from Southampton lifestyle survey

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
20% decrease in death rates from CHD in people under 75	Premature mortality 13.9% above City average (Mid Term Evaluation)	Directly Aged Standardised Death Rate per 100, 000 population has fallen from 141.19 in 2001-3 to 104.11 in 2003-5	Yes, but see comment	There is no baseline for 1999. Figures have fallen 26% between the three year intervals of 2002/3 and 2003-5, but this is based on a small number of individuals (which is why rolling 3 year figures are used)	
10% decrease in death rates from cancer in people under 75.	Under 75 Cancer Mortality 22.9% above City average (Mid Term Evaluation)	Directly Aged Standardised Death Rate per 100, 000 population has fluctuated from 191.06 in 2001-3 to 203.98 in 2002-4 to 182.19 in 2003-5	Unclear	There is no baseline data for direct comparison. Figures have fluctuated between 2001/3 and 2003/5	PCT
5% reduction in self-reported anxiety, stress & nerves	No data available for SRB area	2006 9% reported anxiety or stress in the last 3 months they couldn't cope with.	Unknown	No baseline data.	2006 Southampton lifestyle survey
2.5% reduction in self reported depression	No data available for SRB area	No data available for SRB area	Unknown		
3% reduction in people that are overweight	No baseline data for SRB area.	Data available on a PCT locality level but not for the SRB area. Data records BMI over 30 for the four localities. From the Lifestyle Survey, self reported levels of fitness for the area show that in 2006 71% consider themselves to do no or insufficient physical activity compared to 70% for Southampton.	Unknown	There is no baseline data or current data at SRB level for levels of obesity. Level of physical activity is likely to be a useful proxy indicator (the lifestyle survey also includes data on diet, but there is no breakdown into areas).	PCT (locality level data) 2006 Southampton lifestyle survey (fitness levels)
Ensure that 100% of OSR residents can see a primary care professional within one working day and a GP within 2 working days	"Limited primary care facilities" (from SRB bid document).	All PCT practices have achieved this target [NB - the DH states that the PCT can include	Yes, but see comment	Because of the way the Department of Health has defined it, the target has been	PCT

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
100 outpatient appointments to be delivered in local area, in primary care & community settings	No baseline data available.	practices that refer to the Walk in Centre and have signed a PCT agreement to this effect and thus can be counted as achieving the targets. All PCT practices have signed the WIC agreement for PCP. Grove Road in Shirley provide a GPSI dermatology clinic - in 05/06 there were 1761 dermatology attendances, from April 06 - Dec 06 there have been 1345 dermatology attendances	Yes	met not by the provision of local facilities, but by the provision of a Walk in Centre, which presumably is not in Outer Shirley. Although it may not be within DoH definition of Primary care services Pickle Coppice as increased the availability and accessibility to a range of non-GP primary and community care services. Due to the structural delivery of GP services the PCT were unable to deliver GP involvement as part of the development. Not clear how useful this target is, as it has been met by the provision of one clinic.	PCT
CHP Reduction by 80,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions	1.15 million tonnes of CO ² emissions (City total)	CHP will not be completed by the end of the programme so reduction by 80,000 tonnes of CO ² emissions	No		Delivery Plan

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>Sustainable living</p> <p>Increase in number of residents and pupils aware of sustainable lifestyle</p> <p>Reduction in number of residents categorised as being in fuel poverty</p>	<p>“Lack of awareness of sustainable lifestyles”</p> <p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>(30% of target for City) are not expected to be achieved until after March 08</p> <p>Sustainable lifestyles project finished. Unclear if data has been collected on its impact.</p> <p>No data for SRB area</p>	<p>Unknown</p> <p>Unknown</p>	<p>This target was linked to the delivery of the CHP that is now beyond the life of the programme.</p>	<p>Delivery Plan</p>

SO2: To improve education and lifelong learning opportunities

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>Learning hubs</p> <p>Number of residents with post school qualification increased to City average</p> <p>Number of 18-25 with post school qualification increased to City average</p> <p>KS1 % pupils gaining L2B+ SRB6 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 5 percentage points below the 3 year LEA average No school to have less than an average of 40% of pupils who have gained Level 2B or more at KS1 in the 3 years</p> <p>KS2 % pupils gaining L4+ SRB6 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 5 percentage points below the 3 year LEA average</p> <p>No school to have less than an average of 45% of pupils who have gained Level 4 or more at KS2 in the 3 years</p>	<p>Y11 continue to FE (2001) Millbrook 39% Redbridge 55% (City 68.8%)</p> <p>See above</p> <p>For the 3 years 1998 to 2000 the average percentage of pupils in the SRB6 group who gained Level 2B or more was 11% lower than the LEA average (L2B+ averaged over reading, writing and maths tests)</p> <p>For the 3 years 1998 to 2000 the average percentage of pupils in the SRB6 group who gained Level 4 or more was 11% lower than the LEA average (L4+ averaged over the English and maths tests)</p>	<p>No data available for SRB area</p> <p>No data available for SRB area</p> <p>No data currently available for SRB area</p> <p>SRB6 English 2004-2006: 65.28% LA English 2004-2006: 74%</p> <p>SRB6 Maths 2004-2006: 59.67% LA Maths 2004-2006: 71%</p> <p>SRB6 Science 2004-2006: 79.5% LA 2004-2006: 85.67% Total SRB6 2004-2006: 68.15% Total LA 2004: 2006: 76.89%</p>	<p>Unknown</p> <p>Unknown</p> <p>Unknown</p> <p>No</p>	<p>Delivery Plan notes that an update has been requested from Connections. No data available on qualifications.</p> <p>No data available on qualifications</p> <p>Target almost achieved for science with a 6% difference, but this rises to almost 9% for English and 11% for Maths. However, the gap between the area and the rest of Southampton has narrowed from 11% to 8.7%</p>	<p>Delivery Plan</p> <p>From DfES website</p>

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
No school to have less than an average of 45% of pupils who have gained Level 4 or more at KS2 in the 3 years.		If this refers to English, maths, science 3 year average as a whole, no school in SRB6 area achieved lower than 45%	Yes,	There were 2 schools in the SRB6 area who did not meet it for Maths: Newlands Primary school - 40% gained level 4 in maths 2004-2006 average Mason Moor Primary school – 37% gained level 4 in maths 2004-2006 average	From DfES website
<p>KS3 % pupils gaining L5+ Redbridge 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 6 percentage points below LEA average Millbrook 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 14 percentage points below LEA average</p>	<p>For the 3 years 1998 to 2000 the average percentage of pupils Redbridge School who gained Level 5 was 15% lower than the LEA average (L5+ averaged over the English, Maths and Science tests) Millbrook School who gained Level 5 was 23% lower than the LEA average (L5+ averaged over the English, Maths and Science)</p>	<p>KS3 % pupils gaining L5 or above – 2 year average 2004-2005 Millbrook English: 56.5% Redbridge English: 69.5% Total SRB6 English: 63% LA English: 65%</p> <p>Millbrook Maths: 63.5% Redbridge Maths: 61% Total SRB6 Maths: 62.25% LA Maths: 67%</p> <p>Millbrook Science: 44% Redbridge Science: 49.5% Total SRB6 Science: 46.75% LA Science: 61.5% <u>Total L5+ averaged over English, maths & Science – 2 year ave.</u> Total Millbrook: 54.67% Total Redbridge: 60% Total SRB6: 57.33% Total LA: 64.5%</p>	Yes for 2004-5	<p>No data yet for 2006. On 2 year average, for English Science and Maths as a whole, target was met. However, if it is broken down into subjects, target was met for English and Maths but not for Science</p>	From DfES website

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>GCSE pupils gaining 5+ A*-C grades Redbridge 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 6 percentage points below LEA average Millbrook 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 16 percentage points below LEA average</p>	<p>For the 3 years 1998 to 2000 the average percentage of pupils in:- Redbridge school who gained 5+ A*-C grades at GCSE was 12% lower than the LEA average. Millbrook school who gained 5+ A*-C grades at GCSE was 25% lower than the LEA average</p>	<p>GCSE % Pupils gaining 5+ A*-C including English & Maths 3 year average (2004-2006) the average percentage of pupils in:- Redbridge 3 year average 2004-2006: 26% (8.4 below LA) Millbrook 3 year average 2004-2006: 12% (22.4 below LA) LA Average 2004-2006: 34.4% National Average 2004-2006: 44.07%</p>	No	<p>The gap between the area and Southampton as a whole has narrowed from 12% to 8.4% for Redbridge and from 25% to 22.4% for Millbrook</p>	From DfES website
<p>Absence Redbridge 3 year average (2004-6) to be the same as LEA average Millbrook 3 year average (2004-6) to be no more than 1 percentage points below LEA average</p>	<p>For the 3 years 1998 to 2000 the average number of sessions attended by pupils at Redbridge School was 1.6% lower than the LEA average Millbrook School was 2.9% lower than the LEA average</p>	<p>Unauthorised Absences 2004-2006 3 year average: Redbridge 3 year ave: 0.87% Millbrook 3 year ave: 1.53% LA 3 year ave: 1.63%</p>	Yes	<p>The data show s that Redbridge and Millbrook are now performing better than the LEA average.</p>	From DfES website

SO3: To build a cohesive, confident and outward looking community

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source Delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
<p>Community capacity Level of community involvement increased to City average</p> <p>Early years None specified</p> <p>Youth None specified</p>	<p>Low levels of community activity (Source: bid document)</p> <p>Need for much better youth provision (Source: SRB6 bid document)</p>	<p>120 community groups have been identified in the OSR area with a mean average membership/usership of 15. This means that 16 out of every 1000 residents are active</p> <p>A number of youth projects are up and running including a skatepark, youth centres and youth workers. Refurbishment of Link to health completed.</p> <p>1000 young people in regular football training sessions. Saints in the Community project completed.</p> <p>Coxford adventure centre continue to be supported in development.</p> <p>Multi-purpose Game area at Green Park completed</p> <p>Work on options to replace Mansel Park Pavilion with multi-purpose sport & community venue completed. Bid to Sport England to be submitted.</p>	<p>Unknown</p> <p>No target</p> <p>No target</p>	<p>No comparative figures for the city as a whole are available.</p>	<p>Community Capacity Co-ordinator</p> <p>2006/7 Delivery Plan</p>

SO4: To improve economic, social and physical connections with the rest of Southampton

Target	Baseline data 1999 (Source Delivery Plan unless stated)	2006 Data	Target met?	Comment	Source for 2006 data
Training for work Total 25+ unemployment longer than 6 month to City average	Total 25+ unemployed longer than 6 months as high as 18.5% (City average 12.2%)	At Jan 2007 Total claimant count longer than 18 months for all 25+ was 3.4% compared to 3.8% city average.	Yes	Based on those unemployed for longer than 18 months. This figure is now better than the city average. Figure now lower than the city average, but both rates have got worse. However, the 8.3% for OSR only represents 10 people.	ONS (Nomis 16/2/07)
Female 18-24 unemployment longer than 6 month to City average	Female 18-24 unemployment longer than 6 months as high as 6.6% (City average 4.9%)	At Jan 2007 Female 18-24 claimant count longer than 6 months 8.3% compared to a city average of 10%	Yes		ONS (Nomis 16/2/07)
New workspace Increase in light industrial units in the area		No data currently available for SRB area		Due to the timing of land release e.g. Test Lane, the programme was unable to support project that would have contributed to the target.	
Increased business incubation space leading to sustainable local enterprises	No data available for SRB area	No data available for SRB area	Unknown		
Quality streets More use of community transport	No data available for SRB area	No data available for SRB area	Unknown		
Increase in use of public transport	No data currently available for SRB area	No data currently available for SRB area	Unknown		
Increase in cycling to 4%, adding to City target of 7% by 2005	Not data available for SRB area.	. Not data available for SRB area.	Unknown		
Increase in use of bus to work through Urban Bus challenge	No data currently available for SRB area	No data currently available for SRB area	Unknown		
40% of local people using Shop mobility at Shirley high Street	No data available	Scheme closed in 2005	Not relevant		

Appendix 3: OSR Outputs

Code	Output measure/description	Total
1A(i)	Jobs created	154.7
1A(ii)	Jobs safeguarded	125
1A(iii)	Construction weeks	3852
1B	Pupils benefiting through improved attainment	25556.5
1C	People trained obtaining qualifications	1581
1D	Residents accessing employment	758
1E	Training weeks delivered	13202.1
1F(i)	People trained obtaining permanent jobs	117
1F(ii)	People trained obtaining permanent jobs, formerly unemployed	88
1G(i)	Number of people entering self employment	5
1G(ii)	Number of these who were formerly unemployed	11
1I	People from disadvantaged groups who obtain a job	318
1J	Young People benefiting from social development	27377
1K(i)	Employers involved with improving student education	69
1K(ii)	Students involved in collaborative projects	24
2A	New business start-ups	23
2B(ii)	Area of improved business/commercial floorspace	145
2C(i)	New businesses surviving	4
2C(ii)	Businesses surviving for 52 weeks	4
2D	Businesses advised	128
3A(ii)	Private sector dwellings improved	406
3A(iv)	Local Authority dwellings improved	807
3A(v)	Housing Association dwellings completed	33
3C	Number of dwellings benefiting from measures intended to reduce maintenance or running costs	249

Code	Output measure/description	Total
5A(i)	People benefiting from community safety initiatives	103924
5A(ii)	People benefiting comm safety aged 60+	13488
5A(iii)	People benefiting comm safety who are women	50836
5B(i)	Dwellings where security upgraded	296
5B(ii)	Commercial buildings where security upgraded	60
5C	Community safety initiatives	81
5D(i)	Youth crime prevention initiatives	117
5D(ii)	People attending youth crime prevention initiative	6213
6A	Land improved/reclaimed for open space	17.2
6B	Hectares of land improved/reclaimed for development	1.4
6C	Buildings improved and brought back into use	2
6D(i)	Km road built	0.15
6D(ii)	Km road improved	1.78
6E	Traffic calming schemes	4
6F	Waste management/recycling schemes	30
7A(i)	Local people given access to new health opportunities	23439
7A(ii)	Local people given access to new sport opportunities	50846
7A(iii)	Local people given access to new cultural opportunities	7946
7A(iv)	Number of new health facilities	2
7A(v)	Number of new sports facilities	6
7A(vi)	Number of new cultural facilities	1
7B(i)	Numbers using improved health facilities	1171
7B(ii)	Numbers using improved sport facilities	1567
7B(iii)	Numbers using improved cultural facilities	1
7B(iv)	Number of community health facilities improved	5
7B(v)	Number of community sport facilities improved	6
7B(vi)	Number of community cultural facilities improved	17
8A(i)	Voluntary organisations supported	358

Code	Output measure/description	Total
8A(ii)	No of community groups supported	686
8C	Individuals employed in voluntary work	1473
8D	Local employers with employee volunteering schemes	28
8E	Community enterprise start-ups	1
8F	Number of capacity building initiatives carried out	505
10A	New child care places provided	343
11A	People involved in planning objectives for their community	3825
12A	Environmental improvement projects	10
12A(i)	Environmental improvement projects completed	623
12A(ii)	No. of local people benefiting from an improved environment	60145
14A	Number of projects assisted	12
14A(i)	Number of projects assisted in accessing SRB funding	213
14A(ii)	Number of projects assisted in accessing other funding	83
14A(iii)	Number of project assisted in developing an exit strategy	64
14B	Number of training days	0
14B(i)	No of people placed on education or training courses	2550
14B(ii)	Number of training days	1311
14C	Number of advice sessions	12984
15A	Feasibility Study/Report/Thesis	49
16B	Hectares of land acquired for future development	0
16D(i)	Km of new cycleways or footpaths	3.89
16D(ii)	Km of improved cycleways or footpaths	0.23
17A(i)	Reduction in CO2 emissions (tonnes) - Domestic Installations	588
17A(ii)	Reduction in CO2 emissions (tonnes) - Power Generation	0
18A(i)	Pupils benefiting from projects to promote awareness of sustainable lifestyles	3213
18A(ii)	Residents benefiting from projects to promote awareness of sustainable lifestyles	3080

Code	Output measure/description	Total
18B	No of residents who have benefited from lifelong learning instructions	816
20A	health living advice session	128
20A(i)	No of people attending Healthy Living Advice Sessions	9915
20A(ii)	No of people from disadvantaged groups attending Healthy Living Advice Sessions	3160
20A(iii)	No of young people attending Healthy Living Advice Sessions	4443
20A(iv)	No of people over 60 attending Healthy Living Advice Sessions	957
20B(i)	No of people attending Lifelong Learning Advice Sessions	20899
20B(ii)	No of people from disadvantaged groups attending Lifelong Learning Advice Sessions	5930
20B(iii)	No of young people attending Lifelong Learning Advice Sessions	10332
20B(iv)	No of people over 60 attending Lifelong Learning Advice Sessions	185
21A(i)	No of local people given mobility access to local facilities	150
21A(ii)	No of disadvantaged local people given mobility access to local facilities	102
22B	Area (m ²) of new or improved community facility floorspace	1518.5